This paper investigates empirically whether there is a negative relationship between a country's risk premium and its net worth, as implied by recent theories emphasizing financial imperfections, balance sheet effects, and liability dollarization. We find evidence that balance sheet effects, given by the increase in the debt burden because of an unexpected real depreciation, significantly raise the risk premium. We argue that such an effect is unlikely to reflect the impact of the amount of debt per se on the risk premium. While the result holds for the whole sample, we show that it is driven by those countries with the largest financial imperfections, as argued by imperfect capital market theories.
INTRODUCTION
Conventional open economy models, and in particular the influential Mundell-Fleming model, imply that a real devaluation switched demand towards domestic production and is expansionary. But recent theories on credit constraints and balance sheet effects have challenged this view. The argument starts with the observation that if a country has a large debt to the rest of the world, and the value of the debt depends on the real exchange rate, a devaluation causes a fall in the country's net worth. In the presence of financial imperfections, the balance sheet effect of a devaluation implies an increase in the cost of credit, a fall in aggregate demand, and hence a contraction in economic activity 3 . This mechanism may be particularly strong in emerging countries since these countries generally borrow in foreign currency and are subject to sharp real exchange rate depreciations (or devaluations).
Recent theoretical study has developed the above argument in some detail; noteworthy contributions include Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) and Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) . Empirical evidence is, however, scarce at this point, although sorely needed since the theory by itself cannot determine whether the balance sheet effect of a devaluation are strong enough to reverse conventional wisdom.
This paper is an attempt to investigate the issue empirically. Our approach is to test whether balance sheet effects that emerge when the value of external debt changes due to a change in the real exchange rate significantly increase country risk in emerging countries. Our evidence supports an affirmative answer.
For a panel of emerging economies in the last decade, we construct a "balance sheet" variable by computing the change in the value of debt associated with unanticipated devaluations. We find that such a variable is significant in explaining the variation of the cost of credit to those economies. We argue that our findings are not due to the effect of the quantity of debt per se, and that the impact of the balance sheet effects of a devaluation are stronger during economic crises and in countries with higher degrees of financial imperfections. These results should obviously be corroborated by further work, but seem highly stimulating and relevant to current debates.
The only paper that attempts an empirical exercise similar to ours is Bleakley and Cowan (2002) . But while our papers share the same spirit, they differ in substantial ways. Bleakley and Cowan investigated a panel of firms from Chile, and hence focused on the micro level, as opposed to our work which is designed at a macro level. Bleakley and Cowan focused on investment, not the cost of credit. And, finally, their results are quite different: they found that firms with higher dollar debts tend to invest more after a devaluation, which runs contrary to the implications of the recent literature. Our results are much more supportive of that literature.
Section 2 offers a simple theoretical framework for our empirical test. Section 3 describes our data used and the empirical challenges. Section 4 offers the findings. Finally, Section 5 draws some preliminary conclusions and points to venues of future research. Gali, Gertler and Natalucci (2002) , and others, stresses the effects of a devaluation on the financial agency costs due to asymmetric information or imperfect enforcement: the less a borrower´s net worth, the more he needs to rely on external finance, which increases agency costs. Since the international capital market is assumed to be competitive and foreign lenders base their decisions on their opportunity cost of funds, higher expected agency costs raise the risk premium. A slightly different view, associated with Hart and Moore (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , is that the costs of borrowing decrease in the value of the collateral that the borrower can post against the loan. If collateral is given by the real value of the borrower´s net assets,
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
(1) follows.
Recent international macro models take the above formulation as a starting point, and add the observation that international debt obligations are very often "dollarized", that is, denominated in international currency. Under such circumstances, which are typical of emerging economies, a currency devaluation can easily reduce the dollar value of domestic net worth so that, under (1), the cost of credit must increase relative to the world interest rate (i.e., the country risk must rises). To see how that implication is derived, let us assume that real net worth can be expressed as 
where denotes the negative of the first derivative of evaluated at Since is assumed to be predetermined, the latter condition is that be uncorrelated with ; we shall assume this to be the case in our benchmark work after testing for omitted variables, and examine the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions.
To implement equation (4) econometrically, we resort to three further approximations. First, we replace the expectation of the country risk in t-1, , with a linear function of predetermined variables, (where and are conformable vectors). Second, we replace the term with ; this is likely to entail little loss, since real exchange rates are usually very close to random walks, at least in the case of pure floats or fixed exchange regimes. In the case of intermediate regimes, the lack of hedging opportunities in many emerging countries could make this assumption less restrictive than thought at first sight. Third, we assume that can be approximated by a constant (denoted by β) divided some measure of average country income (denoted by Q .)
The resulting equation is:
where is interpreted as the change, in terms of i's average income, in the value of i's external debt due to an unanticipated devaluation in period t; as stated, our key concern is whether the coefficient is significantly positive.
As already mentioned, the main question is whether the impact of the balance sheet effects on cost of credit, , is significantly positive and whether this depends on the degree of financial imperfections. In positive, changes in the burden of the external debt that are due to real depreciation surprises will significantly increase country risk.
β Note that, for the sake of simplicity, we started with the assumption that country i borrows a fixed amount in the world market (i..e, D* is a predetermined variable). We will show empirically that this assumption can be relaxed that provided that international markets are well functioning. In other words, we shall show that what matters is the unexpected change in the external debt burden and not the amount borrowed per se.
DATA
The empirical implementation of equation (5) involves several data difficulties, the main one being related to measuring the risk premium variable η it . That variable represents, in theory, the credit spread on marginal funding to country i during year t. In practice, unfortunately, available measures of credit costs seem very far from that ideal. The best available proxy appears to be given by the returns implicit from Emerging Markets Bonds Indices (EMBI), provided by JP Morgan. For each country and year in that dataset we constructed a credit spread measure (COSTBORROWING) by subtracting total returns on US Treasury bonds from that country's EMBI returns. We limited our sample to countries with at least four observations of the risk premium. This limited the sample to twenty seven countries, ten of which have data from 1993, in which the EMBI starts being produced.
All countries have data for the last year, 2002. The sample thus obtained includes 206 observations. . We limited attention, however, to the level of the risk premium in t-1 (COSTBORROWING_1), given its high degree of persistence, and other control variables. These are:
the global JP Morgan index for emerging countries (EMBIWORLD), as a proxy for the cost of borrowing for all emerging countries; the level of international reserves in real terms (RRES); and the increase in the dollar value of exports (∆EXPORT). Including these variables helps dealing with the potential effect of omitted variables. In estimating β via OLS we need to assume that the error term is uncorrelated with or, in words, that unexpected changes in net worth, other than the balance sheet effect of a devaluation, are uncorrelated with the latter. This hypothesis could potentially be very restrictive as regards the impact of the real exchange surprise on external demand, and thereby, on net wealth. The same is true fo the impact of the real exchange surprise on international reserves.
But to the extent that such component is correlated with EMBIWORLD, RRES, and ∆EXPORT, the inclusion of those variables does help ameliorating the problem. In any event, we will test the hypotheses that the coefficient β does not change when ∆EXPORT is included in the regression, which can be taken as evidence that the potential omitted variables problem is not biasing the coefficient of our objective variable (BALANCESHEET). Table 2 in Appendix 1 presents some descriptive statistics, and Table 3 the matrix of correlations between the different variables. Observe the relatively high correlation (0.43) between COSTBORROWING and BALANCESHEET; interestingly, COSTBORROWING has a lower correlation with the total amount borrowed, proxied by the debt service in current prices (DEBT*).
Although no firm conclusions can be drawn from simple bi-variate correlations, it suggests, as emphasized in the theory, that it is not the amount borrowed that influences the external cost of borrowing but rather unexpected changes in net wealth. On the other hand, the correlation between COSTBORROWING and the change in real exchange rate, EXSURPRISE, is the highest of the three.
Finally, the correlation of the dependent variable in t and in t-1 is very high (0.71), showing that stationarity may be an issue. Also in line with the literature, the two control variables related to positive wealth effects (∆EXPORT and RRES) are negatively correlated with the dependent variable (-0.12 and -0.06, respectively). (5). In the first regression, which is given by the middle column of the table, the coefficient of BALANCESHEET is positive and significant at the one percent level. Its magnitude is also reasonable in economic terms: it implies that if there is an unexpected devaluation that makes a country's debt increase by one percent of its 1995 GDP, the cost of credit will increase by about 61 basis points, ceteris paribus. The coefficients of the control variables have the expected sign. The level of reserves reduces the cost of borrowing and is significant at the 5% level. The coefficients of EMBIWORLD and COSTBORROWING_1 are positive.
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS

1. Basic Findings
In a second regression, given by the rightmost column in Table 1 , we included the year to year change in exports (∆EXPORT) as an explanatory variable. As stressed earlier, our aim is to test whether the significance of BALANCESHEET in the regression hinges on an omitted variable problem, stemming from the effect of an unexpected variation in the real exchange rate on components of net wealth other than the value of the debt. The most obvious such component is the increase in exports due to the impact of a real devaluation on competitiveness. While the inclusion of ∆EXPORT results in a lower estimate for the BALANCESHEET coefficient, the fall is relatively small: in fact a Wald test, shown at the bottom of Table 1 , cannot reject the hypothesis of equal BALANCESHEET coefficients in the two regressions in the table at conventional significance levels. This favors the view that the significance of BALANCESHEET is not due to omitted variables bias. On the other hand, ∆EXPORT turns out to be significant in explaining the country risk premium, with the expected negative sign, so we keep it in the remaining regressions. 
OLS estimation
Standard errors in parenthesis * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: The Wald test assesses the equality of the coefficient of the variable balancesheet in both regressions. It is destributed as a The next question we address is whether the significance of the BALANCESHEET variable is really due to the impact of debt accumulation on the cost of credit and not to the presence of balance sheet effects. In a way, we are testing whether the assumption of debt being predetermined to calculate the balance sheet effect is key for the results. To this end, in Table 2 we ask what, if any, is the impact of including measures of debt as explanatory variables in our regression. Column I reproduces our basic regression for convenience. In column II, the change in debt service in US dollar (∆DEBT*) is included as an additional regressor. We find that ∆DEBT* is not significant and that the coefficient of BALANCESHEET is not significantly affected. The same happens when we include the real value of the debt service (DEBT95), 4 as indicated in column III. Hence the evidence is supportive of the view that, an increase in the amount borrowed, not only in real terms but also in current terms, is not as relevant for the risk premium as unexpected changes in the debt service due to the variation in the real exchange rate (the balance sheet effect). Standard errors in parenthesis * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: The Wald test assesses the equality of the coefficient of the variable balancesheet in regressions II vs I and III vs I. It is destributed as a 
Robustness Issues
An obvious objection to other results is that there may be simultaneity bias. Our regression equation (5) may be only one of the equations determining equilibrium; other equations may imply that variations in the cost of borrowing affect exchange rates contemporaneously. In such a case, our estimate of the coefficient of BALANCESHEET can only be interpreted as a reduced form one, and not as giving the impact of balance sheet effects on the cost of credit.
To determine whether simultaneity bias is a significant concern, we perform a Hausman test, which requires finding an adequate instrument for BALANCESHEET. But this implies finding an instrument for EXSURPRISE only, as debt service is assumed to be predetermined. Of the available alternatives, the inflation rate (INFLATION) seems to be best suited to act as an instrument for EXSURPRISE. In theory, INFLATION and EXSURPRISE should be well correlated if exchange rate pass through coefficients are constant. On the other hand, it is plausible to believe that the cost of credit does not react strongly to inflation rates. This is corroborated by Graphs 4 and 5, which show that there is a significant correlation between EXSURPRISE and INFLATION but a much weaker one between INFLATION and COSTBORROWING.
Using INFLATION as an instrument for EXSURPRISE, we construct a new balance sheet variable, (BALANCESHEET_INST), run a parallel regression, and conduct a Hausman test on the differences between the coefficients of the balance sheet variable. The basic and parallel regression are both given in 
IV regression
Standard errors in parenthesis * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: Instrument for the variable "balancesheet" is Debt * Inflation In Table 3 we see that the Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients at conventional levels, and hence one cannot reject the hypothesis of no simultaneity bias. However, this result must be taken with some caution, as since the coefficient of BALANCESHEET_INST in the parallel regression is estimated very imprecisely. So it is not clear whether the low value of the Hausman test reflects absence of simultaneity bias or just the large variance of the estimate of the BALANCESHEET_INST coefficient.
Another possible objection to our basic regressions is that the dependent variable, COSTBORROWING, may not be stationary. From Table 3 , we know that COSTBORROWING is very persistent. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that credit spreads are integrated of order greater than zero. In any case, we run the baseline regression with COSTBORROWING in differences. As Table 4 shows, the results are not significantly affected, and BALANCESHEET remains significant at a 5% level . Standard errors in parenthesis * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: The Wald test assesses the equality of the coefficient of the variable balancesheet in both regressions. It is destributed as a 
On the Impact of Crises and Financial Development
As shown in Table 2 , BALANCESHEET has a large variance. It may therefore be of interest to check whether its significance in explaining the credit spread is due to the impact of outliers. This may also be noteworthy, given the prominence of recent crises episodes in the recent debate and in the generation of the theory.
In Table 5 we exclude observations associated with 5% of the extreme values of EXSURPRISE (column II), DEBT* (column III) and BALANCESHEET (column IV). The coefficient of BALANCESHEET remains significant at the 1% level when the criterion is given by extreme values of DEBT*. In the other two cases, the significance of BALANCESHEET drops to the 10% level.
These results show, in particular, that large real exchange rate surprises are particularly detrimental in terms of an increase in the external cost of borrowing. This suggests that the balance sheet effects of a devaluation may be greatest at times of crisis. Large amount of debt do not appear to be as nearly as important. 
Dependent variable: COSTBORROWING
Finally, it is important to recall that the theory assigns prime importance to the degree of financial imperfections in explaining why a reduction in net worth increases the country risk premium. So far we have implicitly assumed that countries are similar in the degree of their financial imperfections, but it is interesting to explore the consequences of dropping that assumption.
As a first exercise, measures of creditor rights, compiled by the International Country Risk Guide, as proxies for the degree of financial imperfections. CREDITORIGHTS_TOTAL is the original ICRG classification, while CREDITORIGHTS is a simplified version composed of three possible levels to classify countries (rather than 12 as in the original classification). As Table 6 shows, both variables negatively, and significantly, affect the sovereign risk premium, other things given. -387.5060 -170.1404 -267.8797 (324.4174) (323.5910) (325.3788) Standard errors in parenthesis * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% In a second exercise, we divide the sample in three groups, from worst to better financial imperfections (proxied by the CREDITORRIGHTS), and estimate our basic regression for each group. As shown in Table 7 , only in the group with worst creditor rights do balance sheet effects significantly increase the risk premium, other things given. This result expected from our theoretical framework, where changes in net worth affect the risk premium only in the presence of financial imperfections. 
CONS
OLS estimation
Standard errors in parenthesis * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
FINAL REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper tests empirically whether, as implied by recent theories of imperfect capital markets , there is a negative relationship between a country's risk premium and its net worth, in the presence of financial imperfections. We find evidence that balance sheet effects (i.e., the increase in the debt burden because of an unexpected real depreciation) significantly raise the risk premium, other things given. On the whole, the evidence is supportive. However, further research should be directed at confirming or refuting our results.
If one accepts our evidence that balance sheet effects are significant for the cost of credit, the policy implications are severe. There is an argument to avoid sharp changes in the real exchange financial unless financial imperfections are small.
Given the frequency of large real exchange rate depreciations in emerging countries, this issue is clearly worth a deeper look. There are several venues for further research. First, an analysis of the net effect of a real depreciation seems warranted, which includes both balance sheet effects and competitiveness into one single coefficient. In our study both coefficients are significant and with the expected opposite sign but we cannot say which one is larger. Second, the impact of domestic dollarization and its interrelation with external dollarization needs further theoretical analysis. Third, it would be interesting to test whether a particular exchange rate regime reduces the impact of balance sheet effects on country risk, as argued by Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) . Finally, the definition of financial imperfections, key in these types of models, would also need to be expanded from creditor rights to broader measures. 
Stylized facts and robustness tests
